Verghese Plainspeak
Brought to light: The intrepid editorials that cost Boobli George Verghese his job as the editor of the Hindustan Times.
Kanchenjunga, here we come ¹
by B. G. Verghese
If it is not outright annexation, it comes close to it. To suggest anything less would be self-deception and compounding dishonesty with folly. Sikkim is to be reduced from a protectorate to a colony through nominal representation in the Indian Parliament. To what end? What deep seated urge of the Sikkimese people is this intended to satisfy? Sikkim is not territorially part of India (Article 1(2). Constitutionally it is a foreign country which cannot be represented in the "Parliament for the Union (of India)" as specified in Article 79. It can only seek such representation if it merges with India under Article 1(3)(c) and becomes an integral part of the Union. If this is ruled out, as suggested for the time being, then the Constitution will have to be amended to provide for extra-territorial Sikkimese representation in Parliament, wether as members or as an inferior species of "observers". And what will these two Sikkimese "observers" in either House do? Will they vote? And will their "representation" entitle the Indian Parliament to debate and discuss and vote on any or every aspect of the governance of Sikkim? If it does, then what happens to the separate "identity" and "personality" of Sikkim which the Government is rumoured to wish to defend? If it does not, then what purpose from the Indian side does Sikkimese "representation" serve, unless it be a thin cover for genteel annexation without representation - to be followed by annexation later if necessary. Elsewhere, protectorates are graduating to independence and colonies are marching to freedom. In Sikkim, a protectorate is moving to "freedom within India" by annexation through constitutional legerdemain?
The worst suspicions about the manner in which the protector has seduced his helpless and inoffensive ward, with some genuine and much synthetic drama, will now find confirmation. No country or people voluntarily choose self-effacement, and the Indian Government is not going to be able to persuade the world that Sikkim's "annexation" to India represents the will of the Sikkimese people. Indeed, this issue has never been placed before them. It was not the basis of, nor did it even have any remote connection with, the movement against the Chogyal which was aimed at democratisation of the local administration. Nor was it subsequently an election issue. The reference to Sikkim's desire for closer political association with India was written into the recent Government of Sikkim Act, drafted with Indian assistance under Indian supervision and, who can blame the critic for assuming, possibly not without some little Indian blandishments or tutoring.
The Government will no doubt argue that it is responding to the "popular wishes" of the people of Sikkim. This can be dismissed for the nonsense it is. The extraordinary haste with which the proposal is sought to be rushed through Parliament and the country in the form of a major and fundamental constitutional amendment, without any prior preparation or consultation, itself suggests some hidden motive. Others will defend the decision in terms of realpolitik. It will be urged that Sikkim was no different from the former Indian princely states; that the Maharajah of Sikkim took his seat in the Chamber of Princes and was entitled to an appropriate gun salute; that he even thought in terms of accession to India in 1947; and that it was Nehru's foolish romanticism that prevented integration at that time. And even if he thought idealistically of a series of buffer states (including Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet) along the Himalaya, the basis for that policy collapsed with China's annexation of Tibet in 1950-51. Therefore, this argument runs on, there is every reason for India to seize the present opportunity to accomplish in a manner of speaking in 1974 what it failed to do in 1947. Security considerations and largely inaccurate factors of history and kinship might be evoked to gild this "historical" justification. But this is hardly likely to carry conviction outside South Block though some chauvinistic elements in Indian society, loyal Congressmen under a three-line whip and some others may dutifully applaud. The strengthening of the "Sikkim connection" may be held up as a triumph of statesmanship and diplomacy. But this would be without counting the cost.
What does India gain from this? Security? But this is already ensured by the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1949. Goodwill? Whose? The Bhutia-Lepcha population quite clearly does not want integration with India; and it would be an extraordinary quirk of human nature if the Nepali majority in Sikkim is agitating to subordinate its natural and native Nepali nationalism to a more distant and alien Indian nationalism. Those resentful toward full integration with India will now have no choice other than to turn to China which has already given notice of its disinclination to accept any change in the principality's "separate identity and political status" through any form of "Indian expansionism." Do the Indian people want this union? It is utterly presumptuous on the part of the Government to bring forward a Constitutional Amendment Bill a few days before the conclusion of a fortuitously extended session of Parliament without any prior notice or move to elicit public opinion. The matter was not even mentioned in passing when both Houses debated foreign affairs only a few weeks ago. The Nepalese Foreign Minister expressed concern over developments in Sikkim barely a fortnight ago and the Government of Bhutan and even the ethnic minorities inhabiting the peripheral regions of north-eastern India may have cause for anxiety and concern over the de facto political extinction of a small but established principality. The country has a right to know whether the "annexation" of Sikkim is part of a larger frontier policy that is proposed to be spelt out or whether it is an isolated aberration.
Far from doing it any good, this decision - and the underlying tendency it represents - is going to bring India insecurity, unrest and international opprobrium. Congressmen as much as members of the Opposition have a duty to question and oppose the betrayal of the true long term interests and ideals of the nation for illusory gain. Only the most blind or cynical will derive any satisfaction over the sorry progression of the Indian presence in Sikkim from that of friend to master. The crusading zeal and decisiveness that the Government displays over Sikkim has not been available for tackling the far more urgent problems and mounting crises at home. Perhaps no need for the common man to ask for bread. He's getting Sikkim.
A Merger is arranged ²
by B. G. Verghese
If anything has discredited Sikkim's demand for merger with India, it is the so-called referendum which demonstrably could not have been held and completed in a fair or reasonable manner within 72 hours. Sikkim is a mountainous principality with scattered villages and hamlets, not all of them easily accessible. The electorate numbers 97,000 and ballot papers carrying the Sikkim Assembly's resolution had to be printed in three languages. The fact that the referendum was conducted with such incredible speed must produce scepticism. No time was allowed for any kind of discussion. The question was wrongly put: "The institution of Chogyal is hereby abolished and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent unit of India." These are two separate issues with no necessary connection. In the Sikkim poll they were linked, almost as cause and consequence. The very question posed was sub judice and subject to an injunction of the Central Court in Gangtok. The procedures followed were of questionable constitutional validity. The only justification for all this can be the argument of revolutionary legality. But if the will of the people had to find expression outside and beyond the Assembly, there was no need to diminish its sanctity by staging a mock referendum. And this in the India of Gandhi and Nehru.
The strident charges against the Chogyal - including one that he operated a ham-radio transmitter after finding that the Palace telephones were not working - make good horror comic stuff but do not constitute a particularly impressive political argument. The Government of India cannot evade responsibility for the extraordinarily inept manner in which these developments have been managed, because the administration of Sikkim is securely in the hands of the Indian Chief Executive. It is entirely possible that a considerable section of Sikkimese opinion is opposed to the Chogyal who is by no means beyond criticism. It is also possible that a section of the people knowingly favours merger with India. But the manner in which the Chief Minister, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, and the Sikkim Congress have worked to achieve a fait accompli casts a good deal of doubt on just how popular these decisions are. The truth may only be known later. The approving statements and gestures from Delhi and the urgency with which yet another Constitution Amendment Bill is apparently to be brought before Parliament to effect Sikkim's merger suggests that the Government has been impelled by some nameless fear to secure a sensitive northern border. But far from having ensured national security and local stability by this act, the country may over time painfully discover that it has sown the seeds of suspicion and unrest. Security depends on people, not territory.
There is no evidence that the Government is clear about how it proposes to consummate the merger of Sikkim. The Kazi has stated that Sikkim's basic interest will only be served if it attains full statehood within the Indian Union. But will the Government be willing to grant Sikkim a status that would immediately and sharply reduce the almost total power that it now enjoys there? Even Union Territory status would give Sikkim more autonomy than it has at present. Is the alternative a separate constitution within the Indian Union which will leave the Chief Executive fully in control while seemingly preserving the distinct personality of Sikkim? But the aspirations of the Sikkimese, according to the Kazi, go further. Presumably, both the Sikkim Assembly and Parliament will have to adopt legislation to effect the intended constitutional change. Parliament needs to examine all these questions very carefully, for the implications of what it does and enacts will remain long after the current euphoria is over. The ethnic composition of Sikkim and of Darjeeling district are factors that should not be ignored.
Finally, what is to happen to the Chogyal? He has denounced the Sikkim Assembly's resolution and all the subsequent events as illegal. If judicial remedies are not open to him he may not have many other options. Rather than precipitate another crisis on this issue, the Prime Minister should concede the Chogyal's request for a meeting and explore the possibilities with him and the Kazi of some kind of modus vivendi on both Sikkim's and his own future. Having accomplished its will, the least that the Government can do is to treat the Chogyal, a symbol to some Sikkimese, with dignity and magnanimity.
¹ Original Text in: The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Vol. LI, No. 223, Friday, 30th August 1974, P. 5
² Original Text in: The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Vol. LII, No. 105, Thursday, 17th April 1975, p. 5